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Abstract: 
Adopting a reflexive, praxeological understanding of science that rejects the objectivist epistemic 
antinomy of theory and practice, this paper offers two complementary Bourdieusian readings of IR 
Theory that specifically aim to conceptualise the structural position of “periphery” scholars, as well as 
their extant and potential “space of possibilities” in the discipline. Grounded in a sociological appraisal 
of IR, the “clinical” approach objectivates IR as a field of international practice wherein the production 
of theoretical knowledge results from the meeting of different scholarly habitus and their associated 
positions, with the objective structures of IR and the international system. It highlights the relation 
between IR Theory and the structural (dis)positions of its authors, the conditions that allow some 
theories to be objectively possible, meaningful, structuring representations of the world, and the 
structural constraints imposed on IR theorists. The “cynical” approach suggests how a “clinical” 
understanding of IR can help marginalised, “periphery” scholars make sense of their “space of 
possibilities” within the discipline, and develop a praxeological, reflexive attitude that could turn them 
into efficient international agents capable of promoting different scholarly perspectives. More 
specifically, the paper argues that their non-native habitus is a potentially subversive capital – and 
hence a potential agent of structural change. 
 
Introduction: 
 
…scientific analyses…of the intellectual world…are 
liable to two different readings and uses. …uses that may 
be called clinical, …in that they treat the products of 
science as instruments for a self-understanding shorn of 
self-complacency; and…uses that may be called cynical, 
because they consist in seeking in the analysis of social 
mechanisms tools…to guide one’s strategies in the 
academic field1. 
 
 
 
International Relations (IR) has recently been increasingly interested in itself 
as a discipline, not merely in addition to its founding interest in its object of study, but 
more importantly in connection with it. Developing within and from its “third 
debate,” three bodies of critical literature have begun to converge within its self-
assertive margins, announcing what could become a more integrated, but nonetheless 
plural “reflexive” tradition in the discipline. The first of these literatures is the “post-
positivist” critique that emerged in the late 1970s. Aimed at American IR’s 
“neopositivist” paradigms2, and led by Western scholars, it has systematically 
                                                            
1 Pierre Bourdieu, in Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J. D. Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992) 210-211. 
 
2 Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations (New York: Routledge, 
2011). 
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engaged the discipline’s core concerns at the theoretical and epistemic levels, 
targeting foundational assumptions about truth, objectivity, theory, and science3. The 
second corpus of critical literature, led by feminist and post-colonial research, has put 
forth the voices, interests, and agendas of disciplinary and social “minorities,” both 
within and outside of “the West.” Informed by the “knowledge-power nexus,” 
scholars speaking from the “margins” of IR and the global order have crossed 
disciplinary boundaries to demonstrate IR’s “parochialism,” and promote alternative 
modes of engaging global realities4. Finally, and more recently, attempts have been 
made, mainly by European IR scholars, to turn the discipline into an object of study in 
its own right, drawing on the history and sociology of knowledge and science to 
produce a more systematic understanding of its structure and identity, and of the rules, 
processes, and constraints that govern its (re)production5.  
Common to these approaches is a characteristic concern for “reflexivity,” 
generally understood as self-understanding or self-critique, achieved by a “bending 
back” of knowledge6. However, the plurality of current conceptualisations of 
                                                            
3 Richard Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism” in Neorealism and its Critics, ed. Robert Keohane 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) 255-300; Robert Cox, Approaches to World Order 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Yosef Lapid, ‘The Third Debate: On the Prospects of 
International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era’, International Studies Quarterly 33(3) (1989) 235-254; 
R.B.J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993); Ted Hopf, ‘The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory’, 
International Security 23(1) (1998) 171-200; Colin Wight, Agents, Structures and International 
Relations: Politics as Ontology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Alexander Wendt, 
Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
 
4 Roxanne Lynn Doty, Imperial Encounters (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); 
Cynthia Enloe, Bananas and Bases: Making a Feminist Sense of International Politics (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2000); J. Ann Tickner, Gendering World Politics (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2001); L.H.M. Ling, Postcolonial International Relations: Conquest and Desire 
Between Asia and the West (New York: Palgrave, 2002); Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney, 
International Relations and the Problem of Difference (London: Routledge, 2004); Siba Grovogui, 
Beyond Eurocentrism and Anarchy: Memories of International Orders and Institutions (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2006); Naeem Inayatullah (ed.), Autobiographical International Relations: I, IR (New York: 
Routledge, 2011). 
 
5 Hayward Alker and Thomas Biersteker, ‘The Dialectics of World Order: Notes for a Future 
Archeologist of International Savoir Faire’, International Studies Quarterly 28(2) (1984) 121-142; K.J. 
Holsti, The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory (Boston: Allen and 
Unwin, 1985); Brian Schmidt, The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of 
International Relations (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998); Ole Waever, ‘The Sociology of a Not So 
International Discipline: American and European Developments in International Relations’, 
International Organization 52(4) (1998) 687-727; Robert Crawford and Darryl Jarvis (eds) 
International Relations – Still an American Social Science? Toward Diversity in International Thought 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001); Jörg Friedrichs, European Approaches to 
International Relations Theory: A House with Many Mansions (London: Routledge, 2004); Knud Erik 
Jørgensen and Tonny Brems Knudsen, International Relations in Europe: Traditions, Perspectives and 
Destinations (London: Routledge, 2006); Arlene Tickner and Ole Waever (eds.) International 
Relations Scholarship Around the World (New York: Routledge, 2009). 
 
6 Stefano Guzzini, ‘A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations’, European Journal 
of International Relations 6(2) (2000) 147-182, ‘The Concept of Power: A Constructivist Analysis’, 
Millennium 33(3) (2005) 495-521; Anna Leander, ‘Do We Really Need Reflexivity in IPE? Bourdieu’s 
Two Reasons for Answering Affirmatively’, Review of International Political Economy 9(4) (2002) 
601-609; Vincent Pouliot, ‘“Sobjectivism”: Toward a Constructivist Methodology’, International 
Studies Quarterly 51 (2007) 359-384; J. Ann Tickner, ‘On the Frontlines or Sidelines of Knowledge 
and Power? Feminist Practices of Responsible Scholarship’, International Studies Review 8 (2006) 
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reflexivity in IR constitutes an obstacle to the development of a systematic “reflexive” 
project in the discipline7. One important difference is the nature of this “self” called 
on to achieve “self-understanding,” which refers either to IR as whole, to a particular 
paradigm/theory, or to individual researchers. Each of these focuses offers invaluable 
insights for IR scholarship. But as long as they are conceptually and empirically 
isolated from one another, some important questions will remain unanswered, 
especially those concerning the relationships between individual scholarship, 
disciplinary trends, and social/global structures of power. 
Inscribed in the scholarly interests and concerns delineated by the 
convergence of these literatures, this paper is equally informed by the problématique 
of reflexivity, but attempts to address it in a way that helps us understand these 
different levels simultaneously, by interrogating their interconnectedness. Its first 
objective is to outline the basics of a reflexive reading of IR scholarship that allows us 
to objectivate our intellectual attitude and production, by understanding what they 
owe to the fact of being shaped by, and expressed from, a specific “locus” within the 
discipline, while objectivating IR as an internally structured space that partly owes its 
identity and mechanisms of (re)production to exogenous social factors. To do so, the 
paper draws on Pierre Bourdieu’s sociology, which enables us to pursue a sociology 
of IR that is informed by a praxeological understanding of cultural production, and to 
reflexively objectivate IR scholarship at the junction between micro- and macro-
social levels, thereby connecting the different “selves” of reflexive IR’s subjects-
objects of inquiry. This “clinical” Bourdieusian reading of IR’s cultural production 
focuses specifically on IR Theory (IRT).  
The paper aims, secondly, to highlight how scholars located in the margins of 
the field and/or the international system can make sense of the constraints imposed on 
them as cultural producers. Taking this analysis one step further in an analytically 
complementary, but purposively different direction, the final objective is to reflect on 
the “space of possibilities” currently and potentially available to scholars culturally 
located outside of “the West.” This “cynical” perspective draws on the “clinical” 
appraisal of IR, and complements it with a Bourdieusian understanding of reflexivity 
as “subversive action,” to explore the means these scholars have of turning their 
disadvantaged, non-native habitus into an agency of structural change. The clinical-
cynical narrative proposed here is itself the product of thinking from the “periphery,” 
from a self-consciously experienced space of “difference.” It might therefore engage 
the concerns of scholars who find themselves similarly positioned, as well as those 
who reflect on the discipline as a whole8. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
383-395; Cecelia Lynch, ‘Reflexivity in Research on Civil Society: Constructivist Perspectives’, 
International Studies Review 10(4) (2008) 708-721; Mark Neufeld, The Restructuring of International 
Relations Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Brooke Ackerly and Jacqui True, 
‘Reflexivity in Practice: Power and Ethics in Feminist Research on International Relations’, 
International Studies Review 10(4) (2008) 693-707; Matthew Eagleton-Pierce, ‘Advancing a Reflexive 
International Relations’, Millennium 39(3) (2011) 805-829; Inanna Hamati-Ataya, ‘The “Problem of 
Values” and International Relations Scholarship: From Applied Reflexivity to Reflexivism’, 
International Studies Review 13(2) (2011) 259-287. 
 
7 Eagleton-Pierce, ‘Advancing’; Inanna Hamati-Ataya, ‘Reflectivity, Reflexivity, Reflexivism: IR’s 
“Reflexive Turn” – and Beyond’, European Journal of International Relations (Forthcoming). 
 
8 The reader might need some biographical information to make sense of the author’s “peripheral” 
locus: born into Arab culture, raised and academically trained in France, having lived in Lebanon and 
taught at the American University of Beirut, and currently living and working in the UK.  
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 Before turning to the presentation of Bourdieu’s praxeological approach that 
informs this clinical-cynical perspective, I should explain how the correlatives “core” 
and “periphery” are used throughout this paper. The core-periphery dichotomy has 
become a central conceptual tool to make sense of differences and divisions within 
IR, and is the product of a sociological-historical framing of the discussions that fall 
at the junction of the three above-mentioned literatures. The “periphery” is replacing 
older references to the “Third World,” but is an equally problematic concept. Implicit 
in the use of the term is its heuristic value in delineating geopolitical and geocultural 
areas that also stand in socio-economic opposition to the “core.” The problem 
therefore lies in the attempt to combine, in one utterance, not merely a set of different 
oppositions (economic, political, academic, cultural), but of correlated ones. One runs 
the risk of assuming precisely what its usage is intended to test empirically, namely, 
whether academic marginalisation (of ideas and scholars) is related to 
political/economic marginalisation (of their communities).  
 Without being oblivious to the performative nature of the “core-periphery” 
dichotomy and its political-rhetorical effect stressing on difference and power, the 
paper draws on the sociology of IR to delineate a “core” whose identity is formed by 
the convergence of geopolitical, social, institutional and intellectual characteristics. 
Against a monolithic “periphery” that cannot make sense of different positionings 
outside (and inside) of the core, it acknowledges the existence of different 
“peripheries” that are located differently with respect to this core, by making explicit 
what characterises their relational position. This allows us to remain alert to the 
important conceptual and empirical nuances that a praxeological approach brings 
forth.  
  
Theory-as-Practice: The Basics of a Bourdieusian Socioanalysis  
 
The past decade witnessed a growing disciplinary interest in Bourdieu’s 
sociology, in light of IR’s “sociological,” “practical,” “cultural,” and “reflexive” 
turns9. Ranging from empirical research on international trade, diplomacy, and 
security, to discussions of epistemology, methodology, and moral engagement, this 
literature illustrates the scope of Bourdieu’s potential influence on the discipline. In 
particular, Bourdieu’s work on reflexivity is gaining visibility in “post-positivist” IR 
circles. As Didier Bigo recently noted,  
 
[i]f Bourdieu is of any value for the study of international relations today, it is 
because his main contribution has been to work on the redefinition of the 
relationship between theory and practice and to insist on the need for 
academics to engage with this relation in their own research practices.”10  
                                                            
9 Guzzini ‘A Reconstruction’; Leander ‘Do We Really Need’; Michael Williams, Culture and Security: 
Symbolic Power and the Politics of International Security (London: Routledge, 2007); Vincent Pouliot, 
‘The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities’, International Organization 
62 (2008) 257-288; Peter Jackson, ‘Pierre Bourdieu, the “Cultural Turn” and the Practice of 
International History’, Review of International Studies 34 (2008) 155-181; Frédéric Mérand, European 
Defence Policy: Beyond the Nation State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), ‘Pierre Bourdieu 
and the Birth of European Defence’, Security Studies 19(2) (2010) 342-374; Eagleton-Pierce, 
‘Advancing’; Special issue on “Bourdieu and the International,” eds. Didier Bigo and Mikael R. 
Madsen, International Political Sociology 5(3) (2011) 219-345. 
 
10 Didier Bigo, ‘Pierre Bourdieu and International Relations: Power of Practices, Practices of Power’, 
International Political Sociology 5(3) (2011) 225-258, 233. 
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While this particular line of inquiry has inspired many scholars to reflect on the 
epistemic, methodological, and ethical dimensions of IR scholarship, it has, however, 
not yet informed any systematic research on the sociology of the discipline, as 
scholars engaging this sub-field have relied on other approaches borrowed from the 
sociology of science. This section attempts to make explicit why Bourdieu’s 
sociology offers an interesting complement or alternative. 
What makes Bourdieu invaluable for investigating the relationship between 
(IR) theory and (international) practice is his consistent praxeological approach to 
theory as practice, grounded in an epistemic position on the theory-practice antinomy, 
and in a meta-epistemic position on the problems this antinomy poses to social 
science. Bourdieu problematises not only scholars’ relationship to the social world as 
a theoretical understanding of practice, but also what is involved and what is at stake 
in adopting a theoretical viewpoint on practice that ignores itself qua practice. After a 
brief restatement of Bourdieu’s epistemic stance, the following presentation of his 
praxeological approach systematically applies his theory-of-practice to theory-as-
practice, thereby highlighting its importance for a reflection on IRT as cultural 
product. 
Bourdieu’s contribution to the philosophy of social science is his attempt to 
transcend the antinomy between subjectivism/phenomenology and objectivism, while 
retaining their respective epistemic advantages. While subjectivism “cannot go 
beyond a description of what specifically characterises ‘lived’ experience of the social 
world…because it excludes the question of the conditions of possibility of this 
experience,”11 objectivism “sets out to establish objective regularities…independent 
of individual consciousness and wills,” and hence “introduces a radical discontinuity 
between theoretical and practical knowledge.”12 A praxeological approach aims to 
retain objectivism’s “epistemological break” with commonsense-knowledge of 
practice (which subjectivism cannot operate), while understanding the practical 
knowledge that subjectivism reconstitutes without objectivating it (and that 
objectivism necessarily ignores). Acknowledging that both attitudes “are equally 
indispensable to a science of the social world that cannot be reduced either to a social 
phenomenology or to a social physics,”13 Bourdieu aims to objectivate the practical 
knowledge social agents invest in their representations of, and behaviour in, the social 
world. When this objectivation is applied to scholarly practice – especially one’s own 
– it becomes properly reflexive.  
This praxeological position has an important bearing on the study of IR as an 
academic field, and of IRT as a cultural product. Firstly, it enjoins us to reject 
explanations that fail to capture and account for the “sense of practice” scholars invest 
and mobilise in their professional activities – their institutional interactions, academic 
strategies, and cultural production – as if they were wholly governed by exogenous 
rules of behaviour imposed by the field itself or by wider social structures. It also 
rejects first-order accounts of scholarly practice (one’s own, as in autobiography, or 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
11 Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990[1980]) 25-6, 
emphasis added. 
 
12 Ibid, 26; emphasis added. 
 
13 Ibid, 25. 
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others’, as in ethnomethodology) that dissociate it from the objective structures that 
constitute its social conditions of possibility and inform its operating principles. 
Secondly, when taking into account these objective structures Bourdieu warns 
against two reductionisms. The first is the type of “internalist” explanation that looks 
at a community of scholars as isolated from its social environment, and therefore uses 
the field’s own intersubjective system of values and norms (doxa) to analyse its 
cultural production. A typical example is telling the story of IR as one of successive 
debates, and explaining them on the basis of their intertextuality, or of their 
protagonists’ arguments. The second reductionism is the opposite, “externalist” 
explanation (characteristic of Marxist analyses), that directly transposes, into the 
academic realm, the social, economic, and political divisions and structures of power 
of the field’s social environment. Such an explanation ignores the social specificity of 
academic fields, which exist qua differentiated fields precisely because their own 
rules and social objectives provide them with a relative social autonomy. Neither of 
these perspectives can explain why specific individuals and groups involved in IR’s 
discussions and debates hold the positions they do, the way they do, at the time they 
do, nor explain the disciplinary meaning and value of “debates” within IR’s history 
and historiography – that is, why and how their intellectual “stakes” become 
intellectual stakes, worth transmitting to every new generation of scholars.  
To understand sociologically how individual and collective cultural products 
come into existence is an ambitious project that Bourdieu pursued against a backdrop 
of competing philosophical and disciplinary traditions – mainly phenomenology and 
structuralism. The concepts he gradually crafted, through a combination of empirical 
research and reflexive-epistemic inquiry, are relevant to IR’s own discussions. In 
particular, the notions of “field” and “habitus” signify Bourdieu’s rejection of the 
concepts of “structure” and “agency,” of the teleological and utilitarian explanations 
associated with them respectively, and of their alleged antinomy: field and habitus are 
mutually constitutive and therefore impossible to conceptualise or objectivate 
independently of each other.  
Because the habitus are “systems of durable, transposable dispositions” that 
are “structured” by the fields wherein they are constituted, they are  
 
predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which 
generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively 
adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or 
an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them.14 
 
The social fields that produce the habitus and are equally dependent on them for their 
constitution and reproduction/transformation are “field[s] of forces, whose necessity 
is imposed on agents who are engaged in [them],” and “field[s] of struggles wherein 
agents confront each other, with differentiated means and ends according to their 
position in the structure of the field[s] of forces.”15 As fields of forces, they are 
structured by the distribution of capital among their members. This defines an agent’s 
position within a field, which in turn delimits a given “space of possibilities”: the 
possible strategies an agent has within a given configuration of the field, to “play” the 
                                                            
14 Ibid, 53; emphasis added. 
 
15 Pierre Bourdieu, Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1998), 32. 
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game by investing his/her capital in it, through “position-takings” that are necessarily 
relational, since they depend on an agent’s position with respect to others within a 
structured space. 
The relationship between habitus and field helps us understand IRT-as-
practice by objectivating the “correspondence between two homologous structures”: 
that of its products – understood in terms of “genres, forms, styles and themes” – and 
that of IR viewed as a field of forces and a field of struggles.16 This entails relating 
the space of IR “conceived as a field of position-takings” and the space of 
authors/paradigms/theories “conceived as a system of differential positions in the 
field”17:  
 
The strategies of the agents and institutions that are engaged in [scholarly] 
struggles, that is, their position-takings…, depend on the position they occupy 
in the structure of the field, …which, through the mediation of the constitutive 
dispositions of their habitus…, inclines them either to conserve or to 
transform the structure of this distribution, hence to perpetuate the extant rules 
of the game or to subvert them.18 
 
The structure and evolution of a field are not, however, strictly dependent on 
endogenous factors. Fields are more or less autonomous from their social 
environment, depending on their permeability to exogenous forms of capital and 
“stakes”; and the social sciences are characteristically less autonomous than other 
academic fields. Because their methodologies have a weaker social authority than 
those of the “sciences,” and because they investigate the social world itself, social 
scientists coexist and compete with other organised groups involved in producing and 
promoting alternative representations of the social order – especially journalists and 
political actors. As their own production is of particular interest to agents involved in 
the “field of power,” which is “the space of the relations of force between the 
different species of capital”19 (economic, political, symbolic) in any society, their 
activities are constantly subjected to exogenous social imperatives, objectives and 
control. A typical consequence of this lesser autonomy is that social scientists’ field-
specific capital is never sufficient to determine their entry, position and future 
academic trajectory in the academic field, not least because academic “competence” 
and legitimacy are partly defined and validated by external social standards.   
However, while these exogenous interests, representations and values 
contribute to shaping the scholarly field’s specific development, they do so through a 
“refraction” operated by its own structure and doxa20. In other words, social and 
political problems are not imported into the field as such. They rather inform the 
constitution of properly “academic” (scientific) problems, formulated in academic 
terms according to the field’s own standards and language. Academic debates – 
especially epistemic/theoretical ones – are therefore “lived” by members of the field 
                                                            
16 Bourdieu, Raisons pratiques: Sur la théorie de l’action (Paris: Seuil, 1994), 70-71. 
 
17 Ibid, 69-70. 
 
18 Ibid, 71; my translation. 
 
19 Ibid, 56; my translation. 
 
20 Ibid, 68. 
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as intellectual struggles concerning representations of the world, rather than as social 
struggles in the world: IR’s debate-narrative is how the discipline’s historiography 
registers its internal struggles on its own terms, thereby misrepresenting part of what 
is really “at stake” in these seemingly intellectual encounters21.  
 What is invested, then, in a theoretical perspective on the world, are individual 
and collective dispositions themselves structured by a given position in the world. As 
the history of these dispositions is “forgotten,” that is, internalised and normalised, 
they become efficient as structuring systems of practices and representations, 
producing practical, consensus-building taxonomies22. Feeding back into the social 
world its own representations, mediated by the field’s position in it, the field functions 
as an agent of the social order insofar as its operating logic remains invisible to its 
members, who thereby unknowingly participate in its reproduction by ignoring the 
praxical dimension of their scholarly viewpoint, and what this viewpoint owes to 
being the product of a particular position within that order.   
To understand the production of IRT reflexively, then, is to understand the 
objective structuration of IR, and reconstitute the praxical meaning that informs IR 
scholars’ position-takings, in relation to their position in the game and what the game 
and its stakes mean from that position. 
   
IRT-as-International-Practice: A “Clinical” Appraisal  
 
 A systematic Bourdieusian study of IRT would need data about the discipline, 
its members, and its relation to the “fields of power” that are currently inexistent or 
scarce, not least because they need to be generated from a Bourdieusian perspective in 
the first place. Drawing on the knowledge we do have about IR, this second part will 
outline some main themes and lines of inquiry that inform a wider, on-going project 
based on such a Bourdieusian framework. As this “clinical” appraisal entails the 
objectivation of the field from a distance, by “suspending,” as much as possible, the 
illusio that gives value, and associates valuable stakes, to this very discussion, it will 
deal equally with all manifestations of IRT – mainstream and dissident – including 
this author’s own preferences and scholarship.  
 
IR’s Field(s) of Forces  
 
At the global level, IR is neither an international discipline, nor a symmetrical 
one in terms of cultural production. Since Stanley Hoffmann’s famous Daedalus 
article23, its American “identity” has been repeatedly confirmed, and the nature of its 
internal divisions empirically revealed – pointing to important differences that allow 
us to draw a nuanced map of how “peripheral” IRs are positioned with respect to its 
American “core” and to one another.  
                                                            
21 These different points explain Bourdieu’s rejection of positivist analyses of academic “institutions” à 
la Merton, or constructionist ones à la Kuhn, which treat academic communities and struggles as either 
isolated from their wider social environment, or governed by internal rules of becoming exclusively 
inscribed in the scientific doxa. 
 
22 Ibid. p. 95. 
 
23 Stanley Hoffmann, ‘An American Social Science: International Relations’, Daedalus 106(3) (1977) 
41-60. 
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Based on indicators of global institutional visibility, such as journal 
publications, textbooks and course syllabi, studies conducted in the past three decades 
have shown that American scholars, methodologies, and theories overwhelmingly 
dominate the discipline24. Micro-analyses of local production in different parts of the 
world also corroborate the “hegemony” of American IR, which has become 
“simultaneously a single local instance of the field and an integral component of 
everyone else’s universe.”25 On the other hand, however, Western peripheries, which 
enjoy some autonomy because of local disciplinary traditions and independent 
academic institutions, are clearly less subjected to this “hegemony” than non-Western 
ones, which are especially dependent on the United States (US) for theoretical imports 
and institutional validation26. In the other direction, American IR is more likely to be 
influenced, if at all, by its closer geoepistemic periphery (the United Kingdom, 
Western and Northern Europe) than by farther sources of scholarship27, and its 
academic system is largely independent from external influences.  
The narrowness and asymmetry of this market of cultural exchange 
contributes to reinforcing the discipline’s Western-centric characteristics. Not only is 
IR predominantly informed by Western philosophical and epistemic traditions, the 
very themes that constitute its object of study are far from representing “global” 
realities. Issues of relevance to “Third-World” politics and scholarship – identity, 
development, poverty, health – remain marginal, and when they do appear in 
mainstream publications, it is usually from the perspective of Western interests28. 
Even conventional subjects like war and security seem to often succumb to Western 
policy-informed taxonomies29.  
Together, these elements suggest that while IR as a global discipline is 
undeniably shaped by the influence of its American centre of production, it cannot, 
however, be envisaged as a single “field of forces,” like a homogenous set of 
                                                            
24 Holsti, The Dividing Discipline; Waever, ‘The Sociology’; Ersel Aydinli and Julie Mathews, ‘Are 
the Core and Periphery Irreconcilable? The Curious World of Publishing in Contemporary 
International Relations’, International Studies Perspectives 1 (2000) 289-303; Crawford and Jarvis, 
International Relations; Andrew J. Enterline, ‘Balancing Theory Versus Fact, Stasis Versus Change: A 
Look at Some Introductions to International Relations’, International Studies Perspectives 5 (2004) 23-
39; Marijke Breuning, Joseph Bredehoft and Eugene Walton, ‘Promise and Performance: An 
Evaluation of Journals in International Relations’, International Studies Perspectives 6 (2005) 447-461; 
Tickner and Waever, International Relations Scholarship. 
 
25 Tickner and Waever, “Conclusion: Worlding Where the West Once Was” in International Relations 
Scholarship, 329. 
 
26 Holsti, The Dividing Discipline; Waever, ‘The Sociology’; Tickner and Waever, ‘Conclusion’, 336-
7. 
 
27 Alker and Biersteker, ‘Dialectics’; Thomas Biersteker, ‘Eroding Boundaries, Contested Terrain’, 
International Studies Review 1(1) (1999) 3-9; Alfredo Robies, Jr., ‘How “International” Are 
International Relations Syllabi?’ PS: Political Science and Politics, 26(3) (1993) 526-528; Inanna 
Hamati-Ataya, Contemporary “Dissidence” in American International Relations: The New Structure of 
Anti-Mainstream Scholarship? International Studies Perspectives 12(4) (2011) 362-398. 
 
28 Caroline Thomas and Peter Wilkin, ‘Still Waiting After All These Years: “The Third World” on the 
Periphery of International Relations’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 6 (2004) 
241-258. 
 
29 Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, ‘The Post-Colonial Moment in Security Studies’, Review of 
International Studies 32(2) (2006) 329-352. 
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concentric circles of “peripheries” centred on its American “core.” Where national 
traditions exist and are supported by a relatively autonomous academic system of 
validation and promotion, as in the UK, Scandinavian countries and some Western 
European ones, the academic and intellectual parameters of American IR have weaker 
effects on local productions, which reduces their influence to the level of global 
recognition and debates. But in areas such as Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, 
and parts of Asia, academic marginalisation is more problematic, as it results from a 
combined cultural and institutional dependence that is often the product of enduring 
colonial structures clashing with local concerns and aspirations30. A comprehensive 
sociology of the discipline would have to analyse these different fields of forces in 
order to avoid any simplifications. Nonetheless, insofar as American IR is a common 
denominator to all of them, a clinical appraisal of global IR requires some 
understanding of its American specificities, as these contribute to shaping the whole 
field’s and its members’ “space of possibilities.” 
American IR is currently divided between a “mainstream” scholarship, 
represented by the consensus between leading neopositivist approaches – specifically 
neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism – and clusters of marginal ones informed 
by Critical Theory, critical Constructivism, and other forms of “post-positivism.”31 
Despite the gradual diversification of “dissident” scholarship, it is easy to recognise 
older patterns of disciplinary orthodoxy characteristic of American IR since at least 
the Behavioural Revolution32. The core’s mainstream has witnessed only three major 
transformations since the turn of the twentieth century, namely, the rise of Realism, 
its Behavioural scienticisation, and its unthreatening assimilation of neoliberalism. 
These trends are intimately related to the status of the US as an international power, 
and the strengthening of the relationship between the American academy, the 
American state, and major American philanthropic agencies, the latter having a 
particularly important role in mediating, and bringing to fruition, the dependence of 
academic agendas on political ones33. To this one should add the academic struggles 
that American IR and Political Science fought to delimit their turf against other social 
sciences. 
This socio-intellectual history has an important bearing on the current 
structure of American IR’s field of forces. Firstly, it explains the importance of non-
field-specific capital (political and economic) within it, and the weight exogenous 
                                                            
30 Philip Altbach, ‘The University as Centre and Periphery’, Teachers College Record, 82(4) (1981) 
601-621; Viswanathan Selvaratnam, ‘Higher Education Co-operation and Western Dominance of 
Knowledge Creation and Flows in Third World Countries’, Higher Education 17(1) (1988) 41-68; 
Henk van Rinsum, ‘“Wipe the Blackboard Clean”: Academization and Christianization – Siblings in 
Africa?’, African Studies Review, 45(2) (2002) 27-48; Tickner and Waever, International Relations 
Scholarship. 
 
31 Hamati-Ataya, ‘Dissidence.’ 
 
32 Alker and Biersteker, ‘Dialectics’; Holsti, The Dividing Discipline; Waever, ‘The Sociology’. 
 
33 Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, The Development of American Political Science from Burgess 
to Behavioralism (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967); John G. Gunnell, The Descent of Political Theory: 
The Genealogy of an American Vocation (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1993); Stefano Guzzini, 
Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy: The Continuing Story of a 
Death Foretold (London and New York: Routledge, 1998); Inderjeet Parmar, ‘The Roles of Carnegie 
and Rockefeller Philanthropy in the Development of the Realist Tradition in American International 
Relations and in the United States’ Rise to Globalism’, International Studies Association’s Annual 
Convention (Chicago, 2007). 
 
 11 
social actors (government and funding agencies) have on the distribution of resources, 
the allocation of symbolic recognition, and the framing of academic agendas. 
Secondly, it underlies the development of the field’s intersubjective system of 
academic and intellectual values, thereby shaping what counts as valuable and 
legitimate field-specific (scientific) capital. These doxic standards are typically 
embodied in a series of value-laden antinomies – science-vs-philosophy, practice-vs-
theory, descriptive-vs-normative, facts-vs-values, objectivism-vs-subjectivism, 
objectivity-vs-ideology, value-freedom-vs-bias, etc. These define, in normative-
binary terms, what the discipline favours or rejects, and hence establish and legitimate 
specific hierarchies by setting ontological, methodological, and axiological 
orthodoxies. Central among these are the value allocated to empirical, quantitative 
studies (and hence to those who can understand and generate them), the centrality of 
state-centric, policy-relevant themes of inquiry, and the adherence to “ethical 
neutrality” as the corollary of scientific “objectivity.”34 
  
IRTs as Position-Takings in the Field of Struggles 
 
These normative-binary terms imposed by the core’s mainstream are recurrent 
nodes of contention between those who have an interest in preserving the rules of the 
game by promoting their worldview as “natural” and “objective,” and those who have 
an interest in changing them by undermining these assumptions35. For the dissidents 
of IR’s “second debate,” the strategy was to interpret the extant version of objectivity 
as “unscientific”; for newer generations of dissidents since the “third debate,” it is 
about either denying the validity of “objectivism,” or portraying the core’s 
“objectivity” as a hidden “parochialism.” Since the doxic antinomies that define 
disciplinary norms underlie and support IR’s internal hierarchies, these antinomies 
are typically the object of these symbolic struggles and “debates.” Informed by their 
positions in the discipline and the social world, by a complex set of dispositions 
shaped by these multiple positions, and by the (institutionally unacknowledged) forms 
of capital they have inherited and acquired through their social and academic 
trajectories, “dissident” IR scholars promote themes, methodologies, and ethical 
attitudes that either challenge these antinomies, or reverse the values associated with 
their constitutive positions36. This process relies on a set of mutually legitimating 
narratives, and is accompanied by the production of new meta-classifications meant to 
create a legitimate space for these alternatives.  
The meta-level is required for a redefinition of “objectivity” or “knowledge” 
(the field’s central values) that would allow the coexistence of different 
epistemologies alongside objectivism (constructivist, post-structuralist, critical realist, 
pragmatist) and simultaneously legitimate the introduction of new, qualitative 
methodologies that can better account for the “complexity” of international politics 
(interpretative, historical, sociological, philosophical). IR’s object itself is 
characteristically redefined as encompassing “multiple” realities – material and 
ideational, collective and individual, structural and agential, strategic and ideological, 
                                                            
34 Steve Smith, The United States and the Discipline of International Relations: “Hegemonic Country, 
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practical and normative. This, in turn, entails a redefinition of the “international,” 
either through the introduction of new objects that are of particular relevance to the 
dissidents’ own concerns and expertise – gender, development, culture, language, 
values – or through the reinterpretation of classical ones, such as war, security, or 
diplomacy.  
Typically, the narrative required to justify and legitimate anti-mainstream 
discourse is one of “crisis” (or “malaise,” as in the Behavioural dissidence of David 
Easton): there is something fundamentally wrong with the discipline that needs to 
“urgently” be addressed, something that undermines its very identity and vocation37. 
The discipline is portrayed as fundamentally at odds with its object of study, which 
entails that its representations and social identity be problematised, politicised, and 
even moralised. In contemporary IR, this is reflected in accusations of “political 
hegemony,” “parochialism,” “social irrelevance,” and “political collusion,” and the 
consequent calls for a “post-Western, “plural,” and “responsible” discipline38. 
The efficacy of this narrative lies in presenting an alternative that is not merely 
“different,” but somehow “superior” to the dominant view, whose flaws are therefore 
portrayed as resulting from some sort of epistemic deception or ontological myopia. 
The symbolic efficacy of Critical Theory’s, Constructivism’s, Feminism’s, and Post-
Colonial Theory’s strategies of “delegitimation” rests on their ability to manipulate 
this meta-level to their advantage. And the culmination of this critical, superior meta-
narrative is undoubtedly the promotion of “reflexivity” itself, subtended by the 
symbolic power of a “know thyself” that can strategically be targeted at the 
mainstream.  
As IR itself cannot provide the tools of its own criticism, these are selectively 
borrowed from other disciplines – often from their own dissident production. The new 
“-isms” and traditions are supported by a novel literature and a pantheon of “key 
figures” – e.g., Foucault, Bourdieu, Bhaskar, Said – that become the object of a new, 
exclusive expertise. The process of creating a disciplinary space for these alternatives 
therefore becomes mutually constitutive of the recognition of this new expertise as 
legitimate academic capital.  
As the space of dissident scholarship develops from within the discipline’s 
many peripheries, its actors become increasingly interested and involved in one 
another’s research, giving the impression of a natural adequacy between their 
respective approaches and supporting literatures – typically and symbolically labeled 
today as “post-positivist,” “critical,” or “reflexive.” An example is the recent 
convergence of the sociology of IR, as the position-taking of pretenders within the 
core and its Western periphery, and post-colonial IR, as the position-taking of 
pretenders in non-Western peripheries. The homology between the positions of these 
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marginals qua pretenders creates a space of intersubjective understanding that 
translates their aspirations into a common academic project, aimed at combining 
“critical, disciplinary self-reflection at the core and the periphery’s revolt against IRs 
[sic] concepts.”39  
In this and other instances, dissidents are not unaware of what their academic 
endeavours owe to their structural positions and specific socio-intellectual concerns. 
What they often fail to appreciate, however, is what these endeavours owe to the 
relationality of their positions. Every time the status of a pretender changes in the 
field of forces, the remaining space of anti-mainstream criticism is restructured 
accordingly, leading to convergences (as mentioned above) or divergences and new 
“turns.” Yesterday’s pretenders – Critical Theory, Constructivism – have been 
partially assimilated intellectually and/or institutionally as legitimate contenders. As a 
result, new dissident strategies have formed, and new lines of attack been drawn: 
Critical against Conventional Constructivism40, and Post-Colonial critiques of 
Critical Theory41. IR scholars’ space of possibilities in IR’s field of struggles is, then, 
constantly redefined according to changes in the structure of IR’s field of forces, 
which affect their relative position, and therefore constantly reshapes their position-
takings, beyond the subjective meaning these have for them.  
 
The meaning of IR(T) in a non-Western Periphery: 
A disjoined sense of practice 
 
What is invested in these disciplinary struggles are IR scholars’ dispositions 
and sense of practice, which are shaped by their location and trajectory outside and 
inside of IR. Scholars located differently, and who come to IR through different 
trajectories, are differently disposed vis-à-vis its doxa, and the field itself is differently 
disposed vis-à-vis their dispositions and practice42. A Bourdieusian sociology of the 
discipline would therefore investigate the formation and nature of IR scholars’ social, 
intellectual, and academic dispositions; how they affect their cognitive worldviews, 
career choices, ethical attitudes, and overall academic “being”; and the extent to 
which, and ways wherein, academic structures undermine or promote the scholarly 
practices they inform. While IR scholars’ autobiographical/autoethnographic accounts 
make explicit the kind of existential conditions that shape academic trajectories and 
choices43, these need to be understood sociologically by moving beyond their 
subjective meaning as lived experience, in order to understand how, and through what 
processes, they affect scholarship, and expand or limit scholars’ space of possibilities 
within the discipline.  
 Following Bourdieu’s analysis, a non-reflexive, subjective appraisal of 
practice is one that lacks an understanding of its objective conditions of possibility 
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and operating principles, and therefore succumbs to the immediacy, or immediate 
“truth,” of lived experience. A non-objectivated practice explains itself on its own 
terms, according to the logic of the field within which it is constituted and performed. 
The practical (and reproductive) efficacy of a field’s doxa lies precisely in its ability 
to shape scholars’ sense of practice according to this “logic of logic” that perpetuates 
“misrecognition.” This is gradually achieved through the training students undergo to 
become “IR scholars,” which requires them to acquire the field’s specific capital in 
the form of cognitive and technical competences – knowledge of IR’s history, 
debates, predominant theories, and methodologies – along with the illusio or faith in 
its disinterested, “objective” appraisal of the world.  
 Outside of the core, and especially in non-Western peripheries, the great 
diffusion of American/Western IR facilitates the peripheries’ assimilation of IR’s 
history, discourse, and parameters, which are reproduced and spread through its 
textbooks and primary literature. One would assume that such an engagement with the 
scholarly problématiques of the core increases periphery scholars’ ability to master its 
language and participate in its discussions – that is, that it aligns their space of 
possibilities with that of their core counterparts by giving them access to IR’s specific 
capital. However, this assumption ignores the praxical meaning invested in IR’s past 
theoretical struggles. The socialisation core students undergo “to be in the game” is 
meaningful because their perspectives and training are already shaped by the field’s 
past, which structures their present encounter with it: when IR’s literature and history 
are passed onto them, it situates their present, by reaffirming what they gained 
throughout its history through those debates and developments, within the history of 
their social setting; it therefore also justifies the extant state of IR, the value of its 
taxonomies and representations, and incoming students’ legitimate place and vocation 
within it.  
But for scholars coming from, and doing IR in a different location with a 
differently constituted habitus, the history of IR, its debates, and its dominant theories 
appear awkward at best44. This incongruity is most visible in those “core-like/core-
bound” non-Western peripheral academic institutions that uphold the standards of the 
core’s curriculum to keep students updated on the central discussions of the field, 
through the core’s textbooks, with the hope that they will assimilate the discipline. 
The problem, however, is that the habitus of the non-native is a non-native habitus. 
Faced with “the curriculum,” and subjected to the doxic principle that theoretical 
debates follow a “logic of logic,” a non-native invests a sense of practice that is 
disjoined from the meaning the history of the field has for those who have direct 
stakes in it and whose habitus it made. From outside this internalised history, the 
sense of practice invested into disciplinary debates remains invisible to an external 
participant, who will take them for what they claim to be – an intellectual competition 
for the understanding of reality. As long as the meaningfulness and validity of given 
theoretical positions is assessed on this logico-representational basis alone, the 
persistence of seemingly “weak” or “invalid” theories will appear unintelligible to an 
outsider who is so disposed that these can only be assessed qua theories.  
IR scholars who have taught theory in non-Western contexts have probably 
experienced this disjunction, along with the pedagogical dilemmas it creates. How, 
for example, does one explain to students not only what Neorealism is, and where it 
comes from, but also its resilience to successful criticisms of its logical and cognitive-
representational features? As they grapple with these issues, students are taught to 
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manipulate IR’s meta-narratives as well. But unless they reflexively understand the 
objective conditions that underlie their own, and others’, sense of practice, meta-
explanation only reinforces the doxic power of the “logic of logic.”  
A quote from the Masters thesis of a former student at the American 
University of Beirut (AUB) – one of these “core-like/core-bound” institutions – helps 
illustrate the paradoxes of this peripheral (dis)position:  
 
Graduate students are normally socialized into a field in which, in the vast 
majority of situations, they are required to continue, and in which they are 
rewarded for continuing, the Neorealist legacy, while perhaps giving a cursory 
nod to the concerns of its challengers. Having been taught a more open and 
contested version of this IR at AUB, perhaps because of the distance from 
mainstream IR schools, the Neorealist intransigence presented itself as a 
puzzling aspect of contemporary International Relations45 [;] 
 
and hence a “puzzle” worth solving. The meeting of a peripheral habitus with the 
field’s structure creates disjoined expectations. On the one hand, the assimilation of 
the core’s doxa gives periphery scholars the confidence that they have acquired the 
“competence” to participate in the discussion. On the other, the distance that separates 
them from the core is deceiving, because the distanciation from the core’s “stakes,” 
without a simultaneous distanciation from the illusio the core creates, gives them the 
impression of possessing a superior, critical meta-viewpoint that reproduces the 
objectivist epistemic illusion, as if distance from the core permitted better 
understanding of the cognitively problematic aspects of constructs like Neorealism. 
But Neorealism, like all IRT, does not solely operate on the basis of its 
intrinsic logic or correspondence with reality. It functions, for the members of the 
field, as a position-taking in a given moment of its history, connecting their habitus to 
the necessities of their position and the field’s past and extant stakes. For this reason, 
attempts to defeat Neorealism by pointing to its incoherence qua discourse or 
representation are not sufficient. They simply miss an important point: what is really 
at stake in the symbolic struggles that only those who have fought and inherited them 
from the inside can manipulate, because the sense of practice that underlies them 
continues to shape these scholars’ relation to their outcomes. 
 
 
IRT-as-International-Agency: A “Cynical” Perspective  
 
 The gradual process of emancipation from “misrecognition” that a “clinical” 
appraisal of IR permits also raises new questions about our extant and future space of 
possibilities within the discipline: Are all forms of IR scholarship equally accessible 
to all of us? Do we have equal chances and hopes of engaging in them and of doing 
so successfully? Are the stakes involved in choosing between them identical, and do 
they have the same meaning for us all?  
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 Some facts don’t matter:  
Is empirical research self-defeating? 
 
A scholarly practice that operates according to the “logic of logic” perpetuates 
the expectation that the value, and hence visibility, of scholarship are determined by 
exclusively cognitive standards of validation and “worth.” Non-Western scholars who 
adopt a utilitarian approach to theory might consider their chances of academic 
success greater if they invest their local capital (native knowledge, language, 
networks) in the production of empirical knowledge about their geopolitical region. 
Those who, on the other hand, think IRT ill-suited to understand and explain what 
goes on in their part of the world might also decide to mobilise this local capital to 
produce an empirical knowledge that would demonstrate the disjunction between 
“Western IRT” and international reality. In an attempt to better understand the 
structural conditions that (de)limit peripheral scholars’ space of possibilities in the 
discipline, the following considerations highlight some of the constraints that 
undermine the disciplinary and political value of such empirically-oriented strategies. 
Firstly, the theory-practice antinomy is not just an epistemic assumption of 
most Western social science, but a practical principle of organisation of scholarly 
labour. A paradoxical characteristic of all social sciences is that their autonomy with 
respect to the field of power does not translate uniformly within them, and IR is no 
exception. On the one hand, they transpose, within their own doxa, the utilitarian 
value society allocates to “science” as empirical knowledge. On the other hand, they 
tend to promote, for their internal audience, their identity as a field, that is, the sum 
product of their specific history – that of the (victorious) struggles that created the 
field’s specificity within the academy. And the privileged realm wherein these 
struggles take place is not empirical, but theoretical scholarship, which retains its 
symbolic power (prestige) over the rest of the field. This explains why IR “classics” 
are always works in/on theory, but also the predominance of theories/paradigms 
despite all successful empirical demonstrations of their disjunction with reality. As 
Bourdieu puts it,  
 
[t]he relative autonomy of the [cultural] field always actualises itself more in 
works that exclusively owe their formal properties and their value to the 
structure, and hence to the history of the field, and always disqualifies more 
the interpretations which, by means of a “short-cut,” authorise themselves to 
move directly from what goes on in the world to what goes on in the field.46 
 
Secondly, because scholars are not equally positioned in the field of forces, 
the lower prestige of empiry does not trickle down uniformly. In other words, the 
empirical scholarship of peripheral scholars is likely to be viewed as a peripheral 
empirical scholarship. This implicit principle of the division of academic labour is 
visible in the social sciences’ relational position in the academic field of forces, which 
constitutes the realm of their disciplinary symbolic struggles. A typical illustration is 
the “Area Studies (AS) Controversy.” What seems to be at stake in this “debate” is 
the intellectual value of AS; what is really at stake is the preservation of the turf of 
“the Disciplines,” which are challenged by the interdisciplinarity AS specialists 
practice. In this opposition, AS is characteristically undermined because of its 
empirical, micro-studies, which allegedly lack any ambition or capacity to sustain a 
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“systematic” assessment of general social patterns, and hence the advancement of 
knowledge itself, which is achieved, according to this view’s proponents, through 
large-scale theorisations and generalisations47.  
The most indicative discursive manifestation of the hierarchy of labour 
between core and periphery is the term “(native) informant,” often used to 
characterise AS scholars and their position in the field of forces dominated by the 
disciplines. Implied in this term is a series of significant oppositions: a subordination 
to a client; a lower professional status between those who produce information or 
merely collect data, and those who creatively produce knowledge and analysis; it also 
implies that the “informant” has no autonomous agenda, and therefore cannot 
contribute to the central discussions that shape the disciplines’ identity and vocation. 
The informant, in other words, is not in the game. 
This scholarly perception is not unrelated to the history of AS, often used by 
political agents as precisely that – a dispositif of native informants on the societies of 
the periphery. The history of IR, combined with the academy’s structural connection 
to the field of power, therefore shapes the core’s dispositions vis-à-vis empirical 
research produced in/by the periphery48. In a non-Bourdieusian, post-colonial 
parlance, these perceptions support and reproduce the foundations of the “colonial 
house of IR”: 
 
…those who live “upstairs” by theorizing about “high politics” take little 
account of those who labor “downstairs” with their data collecting for “low 
politics” – until some crisis in world politics requires specific, local 
knowledge. At that point, ethnographic “servants” must produce the 
information necessary for house members to plug into their theorizing. They 
treat information as data only, not subject to theorizing or capable of 
retheorizing existing frameworks.49 
  
An additional point, which can only be briefly spelled out here, is that 
empirical scholarship is a politically problematic strategy. The “knowledge-power 
nexus” refers to how knowledge-production facilitates and shapes power structures, 
but also to how power structures govern the production of knowledge and its uses. 
Societies located at the higher end of this nexus enjoy a virtuous circle of increased 
knowledge and power; those at its lower end, a vicious circle the periphery knows all 
too well. This begs the (political) question of what and whose interests periphery 
scholars serve when they produce – or more specifically, publish – knowledge about 
the periphery that it cannot benefit from, because it lacks the objective structures 
necessary to turn that knowledge into power (at least a power over its own destiny). 
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And if those who can benefit from it are already so developed and positioned as to 
efficiently transform that knowledge into power – relationally, a power over the 
periphery necessarily – then it is worth asking what political meaning such a research 
agenda practically has for periphery scholars, and whether/how it can be successfully 
pursued despite the structural and symbolic constraints imposed by the current global 
order. 
 
 Dispositions as subversive capital: 
 IRT-as-peripheral-agency 
 
 Of all IR sub-fields, IR Theory is the one that best manifests the marginal 
disciplinary position of non-Western periphery scholars. After a criticism of 
“American IR Theory,” post-colonial scholars now target the “Western” foundations 
of all theorising done in the discipline, even the kind previously perceived as the most 
“critical” or least “parochial” within the core50. IRT is now viewed as “almost 
exclusively Western,”51 and the whole of “IR as we know it” as “an effect of a 
specific [Western] mode of worlding.”52  
IR’s “Westernness” is amplified by non-Western periphery scholars’ 
disengagement from theory. Firstly, to borrow a Weberian formula, the core 
successfully claims its monopoly over the legitimate production and use of IRT. In 
the periphery, Western “hegemony” is internalised by scholars and political elites, 
who “reproduce it by favoring core knowledge as more authoritative and scientific in 
comparison to local variants.”53 This preference itself results from the long-lasting 
effect of Western imperialism, namely, the destruction of the periphery’s relation to, 
and confidence in, its own cognitive traditions.54 Secondly, scholars point to the 
unattractiveness of theory in a “third-world” existential setting – problems facing the 
periphery are too “urgent” to allow scholarship the “luxury” of engaging in 
abstraction – and to the cultural and institutional barriers that undermine the attempts 
of those who might try, such as the investment in learning the language and style of 
the core’s scholarship and getting past its “gatekeepers.”55 To this, one should add the 
dilemmas imposed on periphery scholars by their own academic setting.56 
 However, many scholars consider that the periphery has a strategic interest in 
engaging IRT57. This final section aims to show that IRT might in fact be a very 
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reasonable strategy for non-Western periphery scholars, and to offer a Bourdieusian 
argument for doing so, which rests on the potentially subversive power of a 
peripheral, non-native habitus, if this habitus is understood reflexively and 
praxeologically. 
This relationship between reflexivity and subversion appears in Bourdieu’s 
own work. As an “objectivation of the objectivating subject,” and of “objectivity” as a 
viewpoint on the social world, reflexivity entails unmasking the “unthought categories 
of thought that delimit the thinkable and predetermine what is thought [le pensé].”58 
And this seems intimately related to Bourdieu’s view on socially subversive action: 
 
The specific efficacy of subversive action consists in the power to bring to 
consciousness, and so modify, the categories of thought which help to orient 
individual and collective practices and in particular the categories through 
which distributions are perceived and appreciated.59 
 
One merely needs to apply this definition of “subversive action” to scholarship in 
order to fall back on Bourdieu’s definition of “reflexivity.”   
 But to address reflexivity itself from a praxeological, reflexive perspective, is 
to consider it as a practice that results from the meeting of a given habitus with given 
objective structures. Reflexivity/subversion, then, can be objectivated as a position-
taking that mobilises the dispositions of agents who are so placed in a given field of 
forces that reflexivity appears, in purely intellectual terms, as a natural, critical and 
superior viewpoint on the social world and on scholarship itself. This position is none 
other than that of the marginal pretender, whose perceptions of the “given order” are 
shaped by the disjunctions between his/her (dis)position and the (dis)positions shaped 
and favoured by it.  
The valuable aspect of this praxeological understanding is that it highlights 
what the periphery scholar’s potentially subversive habitus owes to the fact that it is 
precisely a peripheral, non-native one. From this perspective, the position from which 
marginals look at the world and at IR(T) is a potentially privileged position for the 
transformation of the game, just as that of core scholars is a privileged one for its 
reproduction. The privilege lies in the very disjunction affecting their (dis)positions, 
which makes them less prone to succumbing to IR’s doxa, and therefore more likely 
to be informed by, and promote, alternative “modes of worlding.” More than Western 
dissidents, who share the core’s epistemico-cultural assumptions and position within 
the international field of power, peripheral scholars are out of place in IR precisely 
because they are in another place. As long as the core’s epistemic, ontological, and 
deontological assumptions remain IR’s standard doxa, this place is a nowhere that is 
not registered as equal or legitimate. But this nowhere has to be preserved, because it 
is from these peculiar positions that doxas are challenged, that is, properly 
subverted60. 
This potentiality is implicitly referred to by scholars who promote a more 
inclusive IRT, stressing on what their different perspectives can bring to IR. What 
they can bring is a very different epistemic and praxical perspective they have not 
chosen, which cannot be willingly espoused by those who are differently 
                                                            
58 Pierre Bourdieu, Leçon sur la leçon (Paris: Minuit, 1982), 10; my translation. 
 
59 Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, 141. 
 
60 See Pierre Bourdieu, Homo Academicus (Paris: Minuit, 1990). 
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(dis)positioned, and which defeats itself when it attempts to be recognised as such. 
One does not have to justify why one sees the world the way one does in order to 
make one’s view efficient. The core’s efficacy operates, on the contrary, through a 
collective ignorance of its praxically particularistic production. One needs merely to 
draw on peripheral dispositions, and simply “do” IRT. 
 However, the privileged position of peripheral scholars is a potentiality only. 
Firstly, the transformation of the rules of a game does not simply depend on the 
expression of new dispositions. Neither dissident/peripheral, nor mainstream/core 
scholars can, by their intellectual production alone, transform/preserve the structure of 
IR. Structural change is never the result of change(s) in one area of a social field, but 
the outcome of various, convergent changes occurring in different areas inside and 
outside of it. The point, then, is not that if well (dis)positioned, marginal scholars can 
effect change, but that their potential contribution to change is optimal in some 
circumstances and minimal/null in others. Their habitus will function differently, and 
therefore produce different outcomes, in different objective configurations of the 
field. The point is to preserve this potentiality and develop it until it becomes 
structurally efficient. 
Consequently, the peripheral habitus has a greater potentiality of change 
inscribed in it if it is preserved as a differentiated habitus. This entails that periphery 
scholars should resist their assimilation into the core/mainstream of the discipline as 
is sometimes suggested by sociology-of-IR studies. On the contrary, and without the 
need to celebrate it as such, the peripheries’ subversive potential lies in their 
attachment to their own cultures, to what history has inscribed in their dispositions, 
and hence to their difference with “Western IRT.” It is therefore, indeed, in periphery 
scholars’ interest to engage IRT and understand its Western foundations, not to better 
assimilate themselves in it – another cynical, but self-defeating strategy – but rather to 
prevent such assimilation from depriving them of their structurally subversive 
potential. As the past and current states of the discipline(s) show, the periphery loses 
at least as much on the ground of theory as it does on those of empiry and real 
politics. It is therefore perhaps time to think of “the battle for IR theory” as at least an 
equally “urgent” one to join, for ignoring it is perhaps the “luxury” that peripheral 
scholars cannot afford. 
 
 
*** 
 
 
I need not say that I continually strive to 
discourage cynical readings and to 
encourage clinical ones.61 
 
In lieu of a conclusion this paper will end, as it should have started, with an 
apology to Pierre Bourdieu, for having pushed this reflexive endeavour beyond its 
“clinical” limits. Bourdieu was keen on developing reflexivity as an epistemological 
instrument of self-understanding aimed at cognitive awareness and social 
emancipation. “Cynical” uses, on the other hand, are dangerous insofar as they turn 
knowledge into an instrument of social manipulation. While I have used the term in 
order to make transparent its Bourdieusian origin, and its socio-analytical relation to 
“clinical” self-inquiry, my purpose was neither manipulation, nor mere intellectual 
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gymnastics. The “cynical” – but not cynical – analysis proposed here should rather be 
construed – and hopefully understood – as a complementary, different exercise in 
self-understanding: an attempt to “own” the space of our possibilities in the discipline, 
and conceptualise the means to best pursue our intellectual and moral commitments 
within the structural constraints IR imposes on us. Neither we, nor the students we 
advise, have ever found such knowledge in IR textbooks. And yet this is precisely the 
one we need to acquire in order to emancipate ourselves from the discipline’s own 
political order. 
 
